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Abstract:
This article argues that—contrary to the way that it is often framed—the first pillar of
the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is not best understood as an instantiation of a
broader international responsibility to protect human rights. Firstly, the RtoP reverts
to a discourse of powerful savours and passive victims, which runs against advocates’
claim that the RtoP is a ‘rights-based norm’. Secondly, although it distinguishes
between prevention and response, the RtoP is still fundamentally a discussion of
retrospective responsibility. The responsibility to protect human rights, by contrast, is
importantly prospective. The article’s separation of prospective/retrospective
responsibility from the responsibility to prevent and to respond is an independent
contribution, with broader significance beyond the RtoP context. Thirdly, the RtoP
becomes activated when atrocity is building, imminent or underway; whereas the
responsibility to protect human rights may be breached even without a clear causal
link to harm.
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1Introduction
Is the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) policy framework best understood as one
specific instantiation of a broader international responsibility to protect human rights?
This article answers this question (with an overall ‘no’, or at least ‘not yet’) in two
parts. It firstly distinguishes the idea of the responsibility to protect human rights from
the seemingly eponymous idea contained in the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
policy framework, as endorsed by the World Summit in 2005. Having made this
distinction, it compares the responsibility to protect human rights with the RtoP in
three areas: in terms of whether the RtoP is really focused on rights; in terms of
whether the kind of responsibility assigned is prospective or retrospective; and in
terms of the relationship of each kind of responsibility to the notion of harm. The
article’s overall argument is that the responsibility to protect human rights, properly
understood—as something distinct from mass atrocity prevention and response—
involves the responsibility of public agents proactively to ensure that the structural
conditions of human rights protection are systematically institutionalised, before any
significant harm to human rights is caused that would require a retrospective
response.
The first pillar of the Responsibility to Protect policy framework, the state duty to
protect its population from mass humanitarian atrocities, is often regarded as the least
contentious of the three. The first pillar is explicitly offered as a consolidation and re-
statement of a series of responsibilities to citizens, residents and other civilians that
states have already adopted in international law, such as those elaborated in Geneva
Conventions in the nineteenth century, in the international human rights instruments
that emerged in the aftermath of World War II, and in the Rome Statute of 1998.1 The
‘determinate’ nature of the pillar one is contrasted in the literature with the
‘indeterminate’ and more novel pillars two and three.2 This means that it is supposed
(and I choose that word carefully) to be very clear what the first pillar requires states
to do. Much critical and policy discussion is therefore focused on the third pillar: the
international community’s responsibility to take action up to and including military
intervention in response to situations where the state manifestly fails to fulfil its
humanitarian responsibilities to its population. There has also been recent interest in
the second pillar: the international responsibility to build and to enhance the capacities
of states to fulfil their first-pillar responsibilities.
This article therefore fills a gap in knowledge by offering a critical discussion of the
first pillar of the RtoP. Firstly, in terms of which abuses against people are relevant to
the discussion, the RtoP focuses on only the most serious atrocity crimes: crimes
against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes. This is held up by
advocates as a strength of the framework, but in fact it is more complicated and
contestable from a human rights perspective than might be apparent at first glance.
Secondly, the first pillar is often conceived as linked to human rights, in the sense that
is supposed to be a (narrow and specific) part of an overall arsenal of state
responsibility linked to human rights protection. This under-appreciates the way that
the RtoP conceptualises people as passive victims who require powerful actors to
1 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/63/677, United
Nations General Assembly, 63rd session (New York: United Nations, 2009), p. 12, para. 18.
2 Alex J. Bellamy, 'The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On', Ethics & International Affairs 24:2
(2010), pp. 161-62.
2protect them, which fundamentally runs counter to the purpose of human rights
practice. Thirdly, one might assume that because the RtoP is explicitly about
‘prevention’ and ‘response’, that it smoothly incorporates aspects of both prospective
and retrospective responsibility. However, on closer analysis, the first pillar, even in
its ‘preventive’ mode, is significantly about retrospective responsibility as a main
focus. It is an independently significant contribution of this article that it distinguishes
prospective/retrospective responsibility from the responsibility to prevent and to
respond. Prospective responsibility is not the same as the responsibility to prevent,
and retrospective responsibility is not the same as the responsibility to respond.
Fourthly, closely linked to the RtoP’s political purpose is the idea that states are only
understood to have failed at their first-pillar responsibility when atrocity is imminent,
underway, or in the process of being built according to a clear causal logic. This runs
contrary to the purpose of the responsibility to protect human rights, which needs to
be able to identify failures of responsibility even without any clear causal link to
harm.
The responsibility to protect human rights and the RtoP
The responsibility to protect human rights (lower-case letters) refers to the protection
of a wide range of civil-political and socio-economic objects. These can be defined as
a starting-point by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The protection of
human rights can involve, for example: personal security; freedom from arbitrary
detention; freedom of conscience and of assembly; equal access to primary education
regardless of gender or ethnic identity; a reasonable level of workplace health and
safety, particularly including equally robust conditions for women as there are for
men; prevention, treatment and control of epidemic and endemic diseases, at various
levels of governance, within the bounds of available biomedical technology; and so
on. I treat these covenants as indicative starting-points rather than as definitive lists.
Many of the items contained within them can be reasonably contested. It is the
indication of the range of areas of human life covered on which I wish to focus, rather
than on the debates that can and should occur about whether each and every item
contained within these covenants is completely sound.
Contrast this with the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) policy framework. It is widely
understood that the RtoP focuses narrowly on four grave humanitarian atrocities—
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes—rather than on a
broader range of human rights issues; that is explicitly stated at the very core of the
first pillar of the framework.3 Given that this is well established, one can then ask:
How does the responsibility to protect human rights actually relate to the
Responsibility to Protect?
One potential, rather straightforward, answer is that they do not relate to each other
very much at all. One could say that the RtoP is simply not about human rights, but
about something else entirely—specifically, humanitarian atrocity prevention and
response. The prevention of women from voting or driving, unequal pay for equal
work, systematically dangerous working conditions, unreasonable limits to free
3 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/60/L.1, 60th session (New York:
United Nations, 2005), p. 31, para. 138.
3speech, arbitrary detention (outside the context of war): these might all be issues that
are desirable to address, but they do not fall within the RtoP framework as potentially
warranting global intervention in circumstances where primary responsibility-bearers
fail. At its core, this answer is based in the idea that there are simply different
responsibility practices for different purposes.4 Breakey, for example, is one of
several scholars who distinguish between the RtoP and broader norms of Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict.5 He views as both ‘rights-based norms’, which despite
both being rights-based, nevertheless have very distinctive features from one another
in terms of their scope, their kind of responsibility, and the nature of action that each
requires.6 I would characterise the point even more starkly than this, by calling into
question the extent to which the RtoP is really ‘rights-based’ at all. This simple
answer says: perhaps the RtoP, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, and any
number of other discussions that aim at doing good for humans, are all distinct from
the responsibility to protect human rights. To share a generalised belief in humanistic
values is not enough to qualify an idea or a practice as ‘rights-based’. The
international protection of human rights takes, as a necessary starting-point, a wider
and indivisible set of (potential) abuses against humans that require those who bear
responsibility to act.7 The RtoP, by contrast, expressly does not.
I have considerable sympathy with the answer just expressed. Perhaps it should even
be the default position. If advocates of the RtoP were prepared to say (and really
mean) that their framework is not about human rights at all, but about something else,
that might not make a very satisfactory end to the discussion, but it certainly would
clarify matters to a very great extent. It would do so in a way that opens up deep
critical questions—from post-colonial, post-structural and other perspectives—about
what the RtoP is really for if it does not seek to be grounded in and to maintain its
alignment with the actual notion of human rights protection.8 The further problem,
however, is that advocates of the RtoP often do take themselves to be advancing a
framework that they view as linked to the international-level protection of human
rights. One can see this in three complimentary ways: at the level of diplomatic
practice, at the level of theoretical foundations, and at the level of the RtoP’s core
policy documents themselves.
At the level of diplomatic practice, Gareth Evans, who was centrally involved in the
creation of the RtoP framework, explains and justifies its focus on the four atrocity
4 Saladin Meckled-Garcia, 'The Practice-Dependence Red Herring and Better Reasons for Restricting
the Scope of Justice', Raisons Politiques 51 (2013), pp. 97-120.
5 Hugh Breakey, 'Protection Norms and Human Rights: A Rights-Based Analysis of the Responsibility
to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict', Global Responsibility to Protect 4:3
(2012), pp. 309-33; see also Melissa T. Labonte, 'Whose Responsibility to Protect? The Implications of
Double Manifest Failure for Civilian Protection', International Journal of Human Rights 16:7 (2012),
pp. 982-1002.
6 Breakey, 'Protection Norms and Human Rights'.
7 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996); Daniel J. Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
8 For example, see: David Chandler, 'The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the "Liberal Peace"',
International Peacekeeping 11:1 (2004), pp. 59-81; Aidan Hehir, 'The Permanence of Inconsistency:
Libya, the Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect', International Security 38:1 (2013), pp.
137-59.
4crimes on the basis that states simply would not have agreed to anything further.9 This
account makes it seem as though the RtoP started off as a kind of thought-experiment,
where its framers wanted to go as far as possible in terms of an effective global
framework for human rights protection, within the boundaries of what they assumed
would generate the agreement of participants. Those participants are conceived as
states that are concerned with, and perhaps even jealous of, their sovereignty. The
RtoP’s creators used a logic of this kind to arrive at the four atrocity times as a
realistic limit on what they thought could be achieved in practice. This way of
framing the matter makes the four atrocity crimes seem to be a particular sub-set of
the universe of human rights issues, rather than something that is entirely distinct. On
this view, there is nothing in principle or in the concept distinguishing the RtoP from
the responsibility to protect (all) human rights; the difference is only a political one
that stems from a number of assumptions that were made about what would be likely
to garner the agreement of states, in the short- to medium-term, in a relatively friction-
free way. The description of RtoP as ‘narrow’ (in scope) and ‘deep’ (in response) is
therefore not ethically or politically neutral.10 The potential depth of states’ response
to mass atrocities is typically thought of as an effect of the framework’s narrowness in
scope. This ‘deep’ intended response is implicitly contrasted with the ‘shallow’—less
effective, less decisive—responses that are presumed to be achievable if the RtoP
were to define its scope in a more expansive way, to include a range of human rights
issues beyond just mass atrocities.
In political philosophy, David Miller backs up this view. He defines the very concept
of the international responsibility to protect human rights as one that involves
protection from large-scale abuses only.11 He says about the ‘international
responsibility to protect’: ‘We are not primarily thinking in this context about rights
that fall outside this core [of large-scale abuses], such as rights to free speech or
political participation, important though these may be in other respects’.12 Human
rights issues outside of what he calls the ‘core’ of the very worst abuses are thus
explicitly excluded from international consideration, and remain domestic matters of
sovereign states. Finally, a similar view is reflected in the RtoP policy documents
themselves, which exclude a broader range of humanitarian issues: ‘To try to extend it
[the RtoP] to cover other calamities such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the
response to natural disasters would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the
concept beyond recognition or operational utility’.13 This argument, which can be
seen both in philosophical interpretations of the RtoP and also in the elaboration of
the policy itself, claims that those who use the language of the ‘responsibility to
protect’ in a way that diverges from this focus on mass atrocities are ultimately
mistaken or misguided in the way that they are thinking about that idea, and indeed
about the kind of international action to protect people that is possible to achieve in
the world today. There is a sense of ownership at play here about the use of the term
‘responsibility to protect’. This is a tactical way of dismissing non-conforming
9 Gareth Evans, 'From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect', Wisconsin
International Law Journal 24:3 (2006-7), pp. 101-20; Gareth Evans, 'The Responsibility to Protect: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come... and Gone?', International Relations 22:3 (2008), p. 295.
10 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 8, para. 10(c).
11 David Miller, 'The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights', in Lukas H. Meyer (ed) Legitimacy,
Justice and Public International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 232-51.
12 Ibid., p. 232.
13 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 8, para. 10(b),
emphasis added.
5conceptions of a ‘responsibility to protect’ not only as different, but also as less
realistic, less practical, less worthy of the international energy and effort that is
properly put into the RtoP.
These are rather specific examples, but they can also be understood in the context of a
broader academic and policy discourse in which the phrases ‘the responsibility to
protect human rights’ or ‘human rights protection’ are understood in direct connection
with the RtoP. One frequently sees and hears the RtoP loosely referred to as a ‘human
rights norm’: for example, on the webpage of the International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect.14 All of this is a long way away from the view that the RtoP
is something fundamentally different from the responsibility to protect human rights.
RtoP advocates have sometimes treated the framework as one instantiation of a
broader responsibility to protect human rights: one which is practically possible to put
into practice in a ‘deep’ way at the international level in a way that is supposedly not
possible for a broader range of human rights protection issues (however desirable that
may be). Alternatively, they have treated the RtoP as one conception of the broader
concept of human rights protection, and moreover, as the best conception: such that
other conceptions are wrong, misguided or overly ‘stretched’ in their use of the
‘responsibility to protect’ concept. On this second view, the RtoP is not exactly
treated a part of a (potentially broader) discussion of human rights protection; it is
treated, rather, as the correct interpretation of the very meaning of the responsibility to
protect human rights of specifically international actors in the world today.
The latter view, that the RtoP is a full-fledged conception of the ‘responsibility to
protect human rights’—and moreover one that is particularly well suited to the level
of international responsibility—tends to assume, without providing an argument or
clear evidence, that state actors would be unwilling to commit to and/or to comply
with human rights protection obligations beyond a narrow focus on atrocity crimes.
Ironically (because it is an attempt to be realistic), this idea seems to be based on a
series of assumptions that were made by the RtoP’s framers, rather than on the best
evidence that is available about what states actually do. States have taken on a broad
range of human rights obligations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. They
might not commit to these intending to comply in the first instance, but research has
demonstrated that even hesitant, hypocritical or dishonest commitment can lead to
future compliance, through a number of specific and demonstrable domestic and
international mechanisms.15 States have recently endorsed their ‘state duty to protect’
a broad range of human rights in the area of business and human rights, through their
endorsement of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.16 Making states responsible for the human rights violations of companies, in
this way, arguably consolidates, rather than undermines, their sovereignty, so there is
no reason in principle to expect that action on this issue will be any less ‘deep’. One
can arrive at the same point from a different and more critical angle, by considering
14 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Webpage of the International Coalition for
the Responsibility to Protect', World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, available at:
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/, accessed 19 April 2015.
15 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
16 David Jason Karp, 'The Concept of Human Rights Protection and the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights', in Kurt Mills and David Jason Karp (eds), Human Rights Protection in
Global Politics: Responsibilities of States and Non-State Actors, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015), pp.
145-46.
6that international regimes, even those to which most states agree, are not free from the
influence of powerful states.17 Those powerful states (for better or for worse) will not
necessarily view the governance of the world through the practice of human rights,
defined more broadly than as simply the avoidance of atrocities, as against their own
interests.18 The point is not that one should be overly optimistic about the actions that
states will take. Rather, the point is a comparative one about whether or not the RtoP
should be viewed especially ‘deep’, due to its narrow focus on atrocities only, relative
to any other area of human rights practice. There is no sound reason that I can see to
explain why one should necessarily expect less ‘deep’ action to protect privacy rights,
or to protect against child labour, or to protect from derisory working conditions, or to
protect from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and gender in primary education
systems—even though none of these constitutes the large-scale humanitarian
atrocities that activate the RtoP. For these reasons, I do not think this ‘conception’
view is a very strong one (or even that it is one that many RtoP advocates themselves
hold). Therefore, I set it aside for the rest of this article.
On the other hand, the idea that the RtoP is an instantiation of human rights protection
is more plausible, even if it, too, is ultimately mistaken. It is an attempt to link the
RtoP to the broader concept of the responsibility to protect human rights, by saying
that this is just one particular segment of a larger and multifaceted project. Rather
than either completely rejecting the sincerity of the attempt, on the one hand, or taking
for granted that it works seamlessly, on the other, this article now proceeds to evaluate
the extent to which the attempt has succeeded and/or failed. It does so by assessing
the RtoP framework, and particularly its first pillar, in light of an account of what the
responsibility to protect human rights (lower-case) actually requires responsibility-
bearers to do.
What does human rights protection require?
Rights and beneficence
The first and most concise problem is that there is no clear link between prevention of
and response to humanitarian atrocities, and the idea of having a specific right with
co-relative duties.19 At first glance the logic might seem straightforward: everyone has
a ‘right’ not to be massacred, so both the states in which individuals are resident, and
also the international community, have co-relative duties to prevent and to respond to
violations of those rights. However it is not actually that simple. There are numerous
views about the nature of ‘rights’. For example, they can be viewed in a traditional
way as political entitlements, or from a more critical perspective as tools to use to
struggle and/or resist against those with power. But whatever else they are, rights are
typically defined in opposition to the discourse of passive, helpless victims, who
require powerful, benevolent saviours to be responsible for them.20 Arendt thought
17 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999).
18 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
19 On the relationship between human rights and duties, see: John Tasioulas, 'Taking Rights Out of
Human Rights', Ethics 120:4 (2010), pp. 647-78.
20 Peter Singer, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:3 (1972), pp. 229-
43; Allen Buchanan, 'Justice and Charity', Ethics 97:3 (1987), pp. 558-75. See also: William Easterly,
7that human rights, when they are defined as the only idea that people have to fall back
on once their rights of citizenship are stripped away, enabled, rather than resolved,
many of the humanitarian atrocities of the inter-war period and World War II.21
Human beings who have been stripped of everything else, and who are left nakedly to
rely on the beneficence of the powerful, do not really have rights in any sense, even if
the powerful are made to feel and to act more responsibly toward them.22 Regardless
of the valid (potentially endless) debates that one could have about what rights are, it
is fairly clear that this is what they are not. This is not really a ‘hard case’, but rather
the beginning of the rest of the discussion.
Conversely, many of the world’s states—even those that have a record of preventing
the occurrence of large-scale atrocity crimes within their borders—regularly, routinely
and systematically engage in the more quotidian violation of civil-political and/or
socio-economic human rights. When states fulfil duties that they have been assigned
under the first pillar of the RtoP to protect their population from mass atrocities, they
have surely fulfilled a duty of some kind: one which is important, and can be justified
according to various moral, political and legal foundations. However, this does not
clearly or obviously mean that they have fulfilled a duty that co-relates to their
citizens’ and residents’ human rights. The first-pillar responsibilities of states to
protect populations can be only understood as directed to individual people if those
people are understood in their role as victims or potential victims of humanitarian
disasters. Evans says in one explanation of the RtoP: ‘Focus not on the notion of
“intervention” but of protection: look at the whole issue from the perspective of the
victims, the men being killed, the women being raped, the children dying of
starvation’ (emphasis in original).23 This is not exactly an invitation to treat people
robustly as agents and as rights-holders. They are helpless victims that require saving.
Responsibility for human rights, on the other hand, needs to be understood to be
directed toward people in their entirety—not viewed partially as bearers of one
narrow role or another in which they become subjected to abuses—in order to count
as responsibility linked to human rights. A framework that stays inactive when a
person does not have access to an equal level of primary education because of his or
her ethnicity, or who as an adult lacks empowerment in the workplace and in the
public sphere because of gender is about something other than protecting human
rights. One might think that the RtoP’s consideration in 2013 of how best to catch
atrocities ‘early’ by looking for risk factors—including human rights risk factors—
that build up to them, responds to this objection.24 However, not all human rights
problems are risk factors for mass atrocities. Any perceived need to link such
problems to their potential to produce atrocity crimes at some point in the future, in
order to be taken seriously in today’s world as an object of international resources and
global action, is a symptom of the disjuncture rather than its solution.
The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Little Good (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
21 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1968), pp. 267-302.
22 David Jason Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights: Transnational Corporations in Imperfect States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 78.
23 Gareth Evans, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All', Irish
Studies in International Affairs 20:1 (2009), p. 9.
24 Compare: United Nations Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and
Prevention, A/67/929–S/2013/399, United Nations General Assembly, 67th session (New York: United
Nations, 2013).
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is meant to represent an analytical truth (rather than an empirical or synthetic truth)
about the nature of rights and rights-holders. The rights-related purpose of the RtoP
might plausibly be to re-establish the conditions of human rights in contexts where
those conditions have already been shattered. However, that is not quite the same as
saying that that the RtoP itself—as a reversion to a discussion of helpless victims and
powerful saviours—is the direct enactment of a rights-based duty. This is a non-
problem if the RtoP and the responsibility to protect human rights are understood to
be radically different concepts and practices. It does, however, pose a challenge to the
view that the RtoP is one partial, ‘narrow and deep’ way to instantiate a broader
international responsibility to protect human rights.
Prospective and retrospective responsibility
This sub-section and the subsequent one together constitute an argument that the main
political purpose of the RtoP is to assign responsibility that is retrospective, whereas
the responsibility to protect human rights has an importantly prospective nature.
Responsibility can be understood as prospective and as retrospective. Prospective
responsibility is forward-looking: something that a moral agent simply has to do,
often regardless of consequences. Retrospective responsibility is backward-looking. It
often associated with the legal notion of ‘accountability’: one looks after the fact at a
chain of events and outcomes, in order to determine who or what was responsible for
them. These are simplified caricatures of a set of very rich debates that have occurred
over a number of decades in legal theory.25 Nevertheless, they should still help
readers who are unfamiliar with the terms to get an initial lock on the distinction that
is being drawn. The term ‘duty’ has sometimes been contrasted with the term
‘responsibility’ on the basis that the former has been understood as prospective
whereas the latter has been understood as retrospective. This is the impression, for
example, that one gets from Hart’s seminal discussion of the term ‘responsibility’,
which defines even ‘role responsibility’—a notion that seems at first glance to be
prospective—in terms of knowing who is responsible for negative outcomes in the
past, on the basis of a role that should could or should have performed better.26
However, this association has been convincingly challenged by Cane, who argues that
responsibility, even in the law, can be understood as having important prospective as
well as retrospective elements.27
The prospective/retrospective distinction has an important epistemic element to it.
One may categorise responsibility as prospective if one can know before the fact that
an agent will be responsible for something that might happen in the future, or for the
interests or well-being of someone in general. By contrast, one may categorise
responsibility as retrospective if one can only determine after (or sometimes during)
an event who or what is responsible for it.28 To draw this distinction does not imply
25 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968); Graham Haydon, 'On Being
Responsible', Philosophical Quarterly 28:110 (1978), pp. 46-57; Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and
Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002).
26 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 210-30.
27 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality.
28 One can also distinguish moral responsibility, which can only be borne by moral agents, from
responsibility that is purely causal. For example an object that blows into a person’s path causes her to
9that prospective and retrospective responsibility are mutually incompatible, and that
any kind of responsibility must be either one or the other, with no relationship
between them. To the contrary: the prospective and retrospective aspects of
responsibility can be viewed as having important links between them.29 It is still
possible, however, to assess where the primary focus of any form of practical
responsibility lies, and how this, in turn, affects the way that ideas about specific
kinds of responsibility are put into practice.
The RtoP framework involves a discussion of prevention of and response to mass
atrocities. This might be viewed as equivalent to the distinction that I am trying to
draw between prospective and retrospective responsibility, and moreover as
straightforward evidence that the RtoP is both at once. However, it would be a
mistake to associate the notion of ‘prevention’ solely with prospective responsibility
and the notion of ‘response’ solely with retrospective responsibility. For example, a
lifeguard has a prospective responsibility to respond to situations of drowning, but
this does not make him automatically (retrospectively) responsible if someone
drowns. A person might have been swimming while heavily intoxicated; in this case,
if the lifeguard has done the best he can, he has fulfilled his responsibility. Note too
that this is different from the prospective responsibility to prevent drowning, for
example by setting up signs and flags on beaches, or publishing daily updates about
swimming conditions, or educating the public about safe and unsafe swimming. This
responsibility might not fall on the lifeguard at all, but rather on some other municipal
or national authority. One can fail at both of these kinds of prospective responsibility,
by failing to take all reasonable steps to act in the prescribed way, even if no one has
actually drowned. It would seem to defeat the purpose of this kind of responsibility if
people need actually to start drowning before a failure of responsibility can be
identified. Differently still, one can hold a moral agent responsible retrospectively for
failing to prevent a harmful outcome, even if that moral agent had no specific relevant
prospective duty. For example, industrialised countries are retrospectively responsible
for climate change (which is a failure of prevention), even if they had no way of
knowing at the outset of the industrialisation process that climate change would result.
This is a separate question from one about who is responsible (retrospectively) to
respond, even though the answer to one question might partially inform the answer to
the other. Table 1 illustrates that the distinction between prevention and response is
not the same as the distinction between prospective and retrospective responsibility.
fall: the object is causally responsible but not morally responsible. To be clear, I am addressing moral
responsibility in this article, although moral responsibility can sometimes involve causal elements.
David Miller, 'Distributing Responsibilities', Journal of Political Philosophy 9:4 (2001), pp. 453-71.
29 David Jason Karp and Kurt Mills, 'Introduction: Human Rights Responsibilities of States and Non-
State Actors', in Kurt Mills and David Jason Karp (eds), Human Rights Protection in Global Politics:
Responsibilities of States and Non-State Actors, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 7-8.
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Table 1: Prospective/Retrospective Responsibility and Prevention/Response:
What counts as a failure?
Prospective Responsibility Retrospective Responsibility
Prevention Responsibility for a person,
object, outcome or event,
irrespective of direct causal
involvement (for example,
because of one’s role or because
one had a duty of care).
One has failed to fulfil one’s
responsibility if one fails to take
appropriate preventive action,
regardless of whether the
outcome or event actually comes
to pass.
The responsibility to take all
reasonable steps to avoid future
harm.
One has failed to fulfil one’s
responsibility if harm occurs that
can be traced back one’s actions
or inactions that failed to prevent
it.
Response Responsibility to take future
action if a pre-specified set of
circumstances arises.
One has failed to fulfil one’s
responsibility if those pre-
specified circumstances arise,
and if one does not respond at
all, if one does not respond
appropriately, and/or if one is
not in a position to respond.
Responsibility to act in a way
that minimises harm or
minimises a problem, once harm
or a problem is imminent or
underway.
One has failed to fulfil one’s
responsibility if one’s actions are
harmful, or if one callously
ignores a problem that one has
the capacity to address.
The RtoP’s third pillar, which involves the responsibilities of outside states to
intervene in cases of a failure of a first-pillar responsibility, is quite obviously centred
on retrospective duties of response. It is not as clear, however, what kind of
responsibility the first pillar assigns to states when it says that they have the
responsibility to protect their populations. I now argue that the RtoP’s first pillar, even
(perhaps especially) in its prevention mode, reflects an overriding concern with
retrospective responsibility. Paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
document is crisp and concise: ‘Each individual state has the responsibility to protect
its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity’.30 This certainly involves prevention, but is it a prospective or a
retrospective responsibility?
In order to be prospective, one would need to be able to say that a state can fail to
fulfil its first-pillar RtoP responsibility even if no mass atrocity crime is underway or
in the process of being built. This would sit uneasily with the RtoP’s intention to fit
together with the existing international-legal framework of sovereignty. It would
enable outside judgement about the conditions of failure, and eventually outside
interference, even in cases where there is no evidence of imminent or actual mass
atrocity. This is exactly what the RtoP is not supposed to be about, in order to justify
its (internally produced and contestable) claim to be realistic, in the sense of having
30 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, p. 31.
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the ability to garner the consensus-based agreement of the world’s states.31 The
framework’s intention is not to enable an international guessing-game about whether
states are doing everything they possibly can to prevent bad things from happening to
people, even if there is no obvious causal link to a building mass atrocity. The point of
the framework is exactly the opposite: to say that treatment of populations that fall
outside the rubric of the four atrocity crimes are also outside of the scope of the RtoP.
It is more a more plausible interpretation to say that the RtoP’s first pillar is
overridingly a retrospective responsibility of prevention. This is because it is
concerned about causal chains of events leading to serious harm, and with laying the
moral and political blame on the states in which populations are resident for such
harm if it should ever become imminent or should it ever actually occur.
There is a possibility that the first pillar also assigns a prospective responsibility of
response to states. In order to assess whether it does this, it matters whether the state
itself is understood to be the actor that commits atrocity crimes (as well as being the
actor with the responsibility to prevent and to respond to them); or, rather, if the state
is understood as a black-box within which members of society act, sometimes
harmfully, in relation to each other. On the former understanding, we are straight back
to retrospective responsibility of both preventive and responsive kinds. On the latter
understanding, the state in which the problems occur is separated from the
commission of atrocities, and held in reserve as the institution that does or does not,
can or cannot, put an end to them. One can capture the essence of the latter view by
borrowing a colloquial expression about guns, and saying that ‘states don’t kill
people; people kill people’.32 This view, in other words, is that states are generally
either positive or benign to human rights protection, and only become malignant if
they fail to prevent and/or to respond to sub-state actors’ commission of atrocities.
There is partial evidence of this latter view from the core documents of the RtoP. For
example, paragraph 27 of the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on implementing the
responsibility to protect says: ‘[O]ne of the keys to preventing small crimes from
becoming large ones, as well as to ending such affronts to human dignity altogether, is
to foster individual responsibility’.33 There is an implication here of visceral
responsibility for human rights existing at the level of sub-state actors, with the state
as a more abstract and removed actor, existing in a different plane. Even more to the
point, the Secretary-General’s 2013 report on state responsibility and prevention
suggests that ‘the presence of armed groups and militias’ and ‘the government’s lack
of capacity to prevent [atrocity] crimes’ are two of the risk factors that can lead to
atrocity.34 This builds an imagery within which atrocity crimes (can) happen when the
state is absent or weak, even if the state is not, in a direct causal sense, retrospectively
31 Evans, 'From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect'.
32 This relates to debates about the corporate agency and responsibility (or lack thereof) of states. See:
Morton J. Horwitz, 'The History of the Public/Private Distinction', University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 130:6 (1982), pp. 1423-82; Christopher D. Stone, 'Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do
Public/Private Distinctions Matter?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130:6 (1982), pp. 1441-
509; Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press,
1984); Toni Erskine, 'Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and
Quasi-States', Ethics & International Affairs 15:2 (2001), pp. 67-85; Alexander Wendt, 'The State as
Person in International Theory', Review of International Studies 30:2 (2004), pp. 289-316.
33 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 14, para. 27.
34 United Nations Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention, p.
5, paras. 22 and 24.
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responsible. This would be example of a state’s prospective responsibility, because
one can know before the fact that the state is responsible for any future atrocities that
occur within its borders, even if the state is not directly involved in those atrocities. I
have said ‘partial’ in the first sentence of the current paragraph because there is also
plenty of evidence in favour of the former view that public institutions enable and/or
commit atrocities themselves. Paragraph 21 of the same 2009 report says: ‘Genocide
and other crimes relating to the responsibility to protect do not just happen. They are,
more often than not, the result of a deliberate and calculated political choice’.35 I
agree.
In terms of the political practice of the RtoP, one could further the argument for
separating the states from the individuals and groups whose acts are physically
responsible for atrocities through the case of Kenya in 2007/8, in which the RtoP is
taken to have been invoked. Presidential elections occurred on 27 December 2007.
These subsequently featured allegations of electoral fraud viewed as privileging one
ethnic group, the Kikuyu people, of which the winning candidate, Mwai Kibaki, is a
member.36 In the aftermath of the election, the Kikuyu became subject to brutal ethnic
violence. In the ordinary sense of criminal responsibility, one could easily lay the
blame on the militias and youth gangs who were rounding up (mostly poor) members
of the Kikuyu group as the targets of ethnic attacks. 37 The first pillar of the RtoP,
however, enables one to say that the state is responsible, despite the fact that the
group associated with the state’s ruling elite’s were the main initial targets of the
violence (as opposed to the other way around: the state using its power to commit
atrocities against a weaker group). This would be a prospective responsibility of
response: one can know that the state is responsible despite a lack of causal
involvement in—or even, in this case, any clear interest in—ethnically-driven attacks
against a group.
I am not fully convinced by this analysis. In many ways, I view the state’s separation
from the violence as a legal fiction, which reflects neither a proper historical
perspective on the events in question nor a rounded understanding of the nature of
violence itself. Even putting this aside, it is very clear that other cases in which the
RtoP has been invoked more straightforwardly involve those with formal political
power committing atrocities, rather than states simply being unable or unwilling to act
in the face of them, with Côte d’Ivoire (2011) and Libya (2011) both being important
recent examples.38 In these cases in particular, it would be unrealistic to separate the
individual political leaders, members of the military, and other formal power-holders,
from a black box called ‘the state’, which has a separate power to prevent and to
respond. For better or for worse, the RtoP has been primarily targeted so far at cases
where the government is actively involved in atrocities, rather than at those cases
where the state is an abstract entity, standing above and beyond the sub-state-level
commission of violence. Where the state is thought to be weak or failing, the foreign
35 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 12, para. 21.
36 Jeffrey Gettleman, 'Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya Into Bloodshet', New York Times, 31 December
2007.
37 Evans, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All', p. 11;
Abdullahi Boru Halakhe, '"R2P in Practice": Ethnic Violence, Elections and Atrocity Prevention in
Kenya', Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series 4 (2013).
38 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the
Responsibility to Protect', International Affairs 87:4 (2011), pp. 825-50.
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policies of Western powers typically consider this under the rubric of state-building,
peace-building, or the ‘security-development nexus’: a part of ordinary public policy,
rather than a part of the ‘high politics’ of the UN Security Council and the
Responsibility to Protect.39 The state is not always best understood, for the purpose of
human rights protection, as a neutral Weberian shell within which members of society
interact in a private or non-state sphere: it is often an active participant, an actor in
and of itself, one ‘side’ amongst many in a problem or a conflict.40
What the RtoP seems not to do is assign a prospective responsibility of prevention. If
it were to do so, this would mean that failure of a first-pillar responsibility would be
possible even if no mass atrocity occurs or becomes imminent. It would be a
misunderstanding of the political purpose of the RtoP to think that it assigns a
responsibility of this kind. The entire point is to link international action to failures of
first-pillar responsibility, with those failures of first-pillar responsibility involving
either actual atrocities or causal paths that can be demonstrated to lead directly to
them.
Harm and human rights protection: a contestable relationship
By contrast, the main political purpose of human rights protection is associated
precisely with responsibility that is both prospective and preventative. It goes beyond
responsibility not to harm people, and includes the creation of political institutions
that systematically and proactively enable people to access the objects of their human
rights. As I have argued at more length elsewhere: ‘Human rights protection is best
defined as the specific duty of some agents, including but not necessarily limited to
states, to put in place the structural conditions where the moral rights that all humans
have because they are human can be secured’.41
Many standard views of responsibility for human rights treat it as a kind of
responsibility not to harm people. This is the meaning of the responsibility to ‘respect’
human rights as defined in the respect-protect-fulfil conceptual framework, which
emerged in the context of academic and practitioner work on the right to food in the
1980s.42 The responsibility to ‘protect’ human rights, within this tripartite framework,
is defined as the duty of third parties, typically states, to make sure that moral agents
39 Christopher Cramer, Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing
Countries (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006); Mark Duffield, Security, Development and Unending War:
Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); David Chandler, 'R2P or not R2P?
More Statebuilding, Less Responsibility', Global Responsibility to Protect 2:1 (2010), pp. 161-66; Jan
Selby, 'The Myth of Liberal Peacebuilding', Conflict, Security and Development 13:1 (2013), pp. 57-
86.
40 This connects to the ‘new wars’ thesis. See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in
a Global Era, 3rd ed. (London: Polity, 2012).
41 Karp, 'The Concept of Human Rights Protection', in Mills and Karp (eds.), Human Rights Protection
in Global Politics, p. 154.
42 Asbjørn Eide et al. (ed), Food as a Human Right (United Nations University, 1984); Shue, Basic
Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy; Ida Elisabeth Koch, 'Dichotomies,
Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?', Human Rights Law Review 5:1 (2005), pp. 81-103; Thomas Pogge,
'Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?', Yale Human Rights and Development Law
Journal 14:2 (2011), pp. 1-33; Mátyás Bódig, 'Doctrinal Innovation and State Obligations: The Patterns
of Doctrinal Development in the Jurisprudence of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights', in Kurt Mills and David Jason Karp (eds), Human Rights Protection in Global Politics:
Responsibilities of State and Non-State Actors, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).
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do not violate their ‘respect’ duties not to harm the human rights of individual people.
Similarly, Pogge’s ‘institutionalist’ approach to responsibility for human rights
focuses on ‘do no harm’ as at the core of responsibility for human rights.43 The
difference, however, is that Pogge views economic, political and social institutions,
for which we are each ultimately responsible when they act ‘in our name’, with our
active and/or tacit support, as relevantly harmful—as opposed to the relevant harm
arising from isolated interactions between individual agents.44 In the respect-protect-
fulfil framework, the point of the ‘protect’ component is to say that states will be
responsible for what happens, even if they are not the most direct and final cause of
non-state actors’ harmful interactions with one another in the private sphere. In
Pogge’s institutionalist approach, we are each ultimately responsible for what our
public institutions do. These views from both the policy and the philosophy of
responsibility for human rights share a concern with prospective responsibility, as I
have defined it in the previous sub-section of this article. There is room for
disagreement about the substantive answers that are provided to the question of which
agents are specifically responsible, but at the same time, one can track a similar
prospective logic of specifying in advance who will be responsible for any harm that
is not yet underway or imminent, but which might occur in the future.
It would be tempting to end the analysis at this point, but there is still one important
problem. In these discussions, the meaning of ‘harm’ is often underspecified. What
might it mean to ‘harm’ human rights, such that third parties might be under a further
prospective obligation to ‘protect’ individuals by preventing and/or responding to that
kind of harm? This can be answered in at least three different ways. To different
degrees (ratcheting up in degree as the analysis proceeds), each of these ways teases
the notion of human rights protection apart from the notion of ‘harming’ human
rights, and each points in a different way to the importantly prospective nature of the
responsibility to protect human rights.
Firstly, most people will intuitively think of ‘harm’ in terms of doing something to
somebody: causing an outcome or state of affairs, in which a person ends up in a more
‘harmed’ state than they were but for another’s actions or omissions. Feinberg calls
this ‘harming as wronging’.45 For example, one person imprisons another inside of his
own home; or an employer fires a woman because she is pregnant rather than because
she has breached any aspect of her contract. These are surely harmful actions to those
affected individuals. But are they forms of human rights harm? Possibly yes, but
simply to cause harm of this kind in and of itself is not enough to determine the
answer. In order to link such actions and outcomes to the idea of human rights, one
need something more: either an account of which specific agents need to commit the
harm in order for it to count as a human rights issue (for example, was the agent who
caused the harm directly acting in a relevantly pubic role?)46, and/or an account of
how a specific third party with the prospective responsibility to do so has failed to
protect human rights, ultimately enabling that harm to be caused at some point further
downstream along a causal path.
43 Pogge, 'Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World's Poor?'.
44 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), ch. 2.
45 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), pp. 105-25.
46 Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights, pp. 116-51.
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Secondly, however, the notion of harm just discussed can be contrasted with a
different notion of harm that Feinberg calls ‘setbacks to interests’.47 Not all interests
are human rights, but all human rights do seem to be interests. Say that the only
primary schooling in a large rural area is provided by religious actors. The schools
educate boys but not girls. Are the girls ‘harmed’ by the education system? According
to the notion of ‘harm’ that defines it as someone doing something directly to
someone else—as in, X does A to Y; Y is more harmed than before as a result of A;
therefore X is responsible for harming Y—it is challenging to see the harm. To
receive a failing mark that one does not deserve fits easily into the notion of ‘harm as
wronging’ (though, depending on the reason, it may fall outside the context of human
rights). By contrast, for an individual or a group not to be in the educational system at
all is a more complicated issue to digest for the sake of qualifying harm and
attributing responsibility for it. For example, some of the girls themselves (and their
parents) might not even feel particularly harmed, or have any desire for change; they
might be ardent believers in the religious rationale for the current practice. Indeed,
one of the features of structural violence is that it socialises people into not seeing
harm, whereas to others it might be quite evident.48 However, one could still say that
the harm has been caused in a different sense, if one believes that the girls are being
deprived of the tools and opportunities that would be needed for the robust exercise of
agency, in order to make decisions about their lives that are authentically their own.
Their ‘interest’ in primary education, which can be viewed as a human-rights-based
interest due to its link to basic security, basic welfare and/or basic human agency, is
harmed.49 One element that would need to be in place for an interest to be constituted
as based in human rights is that it would need to be justifiable to assign duties to
specific actors to protect those interests.
This line of analysis changes the notion of human rights protection from the third-
party-oriented one just mooted—Z preventing and/or responding to X harming Y—
into something different and richer. When harm to human rights is viewed in terms of
‘wronging’, then a failure to protect is not the harm in and of itself. Rather, on that
view, the failure to protect consists merely in allowing the harm to happen. By
contrast, when harm to human rights is viewed in terms of ‘setbacks to interests’
(always remembering that not all human interests are human rights), then the failure
to protect by failing systematically and proactively to ensure that all individuals have
access to the objects of their human rights, is in and of itself the harm. Importantly,
however, this is not as amenable as the notion of harming as wronging to
retrospective causal logic. This operates at a point in time earlier than that at which
one or more individuals end up in a demonstrably ‘harmed’ state, as compared to a
‘less harmed’ or ‘unharmed’ state in which they supposedly were in before, but for
another agent’s actions.
Thirdly, one could put forward an even stronger argument that ‘harm’, even in this
more indirect and abstract sense of ‘setbacks to interests’, is not central to the notion
of human rights protection at all. To be clear, the argument is not that harm lacks
47 Feinberg, Harm to Others, pp. 31-64.
48 Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', Journal of Peace Research 6:3 (1969), pp.
167-91; Karp, 'The Concept of Human Rights Protection', in Mills and Karp (eds.), Human Rights
Protection in Global Politics, p. 142.
49 Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy; James Griffin, On Human
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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centrality to human rights, which seems so odd as to be absurd; the argument, rather,
is that the notion of harm is separable from the specific responsibility of human rights
protection. Harm can often result from a failure to protect human rights—if so, those
who failed to protect can be held accountable for that harm—but this does not mean
that the identification of harm is necessary in order to identify a failure to protect. The
responsibility to protect can be breached, even if harm is not demonstrably caused. As
an analogy, think about employers’ responsibility not to allow a culture that is
conducive to bullying to exist in the workplace. This responsibility can be breached if
(and simply because) a culture that is conducive to bullying exists, even if no one is
actually bullied. This structural notion of responsibility can be extended to the notion
of human rights protection, by thinking about the protection responsibility of specific
actors as prospective, and as separable from the retrospective responsibility for any
harm to human rights that is caused.
The harm principle is deeply embedded in a liberal discussion of the justifiable limits
of public coercion and interference in the private sphere.50 At its core is the idea is
that we can each do what we want, as long as we do not harm others in the process.
This is the idea of non-interference. There have been attempts to bring positive duties
in to the harm principle, but these have focused on defining a failure to ‘rescue’ as
also constituting harm.51 However, neither the classical minimalist/negative
formulation nor the subsequent attempt to bring duties of rescue into the picture seem
best to capture what one would need to do, in order to protect the right to personal
security, the right to primary education, the right to non-discrimination, the right to
free assembly, and so on. Human rights protection calls for a qualitatively different
set of actions, centred on the structure within which social action occurs. Going more
deeply, the notion of harm is intended to guide decisions in criminal-law and civil-law
contexts.52 If I am being sued for damages, or being accused of criminal action, I can
try to defend myself by saying ‘I did not actually harm anyone at all’, or ‘the harm
was necessary in the circumstances, given harm that I was facing to myself’. To take
the universal responsibility of all moral agents, acting in their private capacities, not
to harm others—even/especially total strangers—out of these contexts, and to place it
at the core of the responsibility to protect human rights, seems to miss out on the
specific political relationship that the concept of human rights protection invokes.
This is the relationship between agents of human rights protection and those whose
human rights they are meant to be protecting. The answers to the various questions
that one can raise about ‘harm’, and what counts as evidence of it for the sake of
knowing whether a particular putatively harmful act is justified, should not matter to
the question of whether a failure to educate girls is a failure to protect human rights. It
is a failure to protect human rights even if it is contestable to define, or difficult to
demonstrate, whether harm has been caused.
Furthermore, to use ‘harm’ as the main lens through which to assess the point at
which a failure of responsibility can be identified can activate a discussion of how to
balance the harm to those whose human rights are under-protected, with the harm to
the human-rights-based interests of others (for example, the religious members of
society in the school example) that would be caused if powerful authorities, at any
50 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008/1859).
51 Andrew Linklater, 'The Harm Principle and Global Ethics', Global Society 20:3 (2006), pp. 329-43.
52 Donald A. Dripps, 'The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle', Criminal Justice Ethics 17:2 (1998),
pp. 3-18.
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relevant level of governance, would insist on changes to the way they run their
societies and their lives. The notion of harm subtly yet powerfully embeds such
debates within a rigid conception of the public and the private, according to which
public protection prevents private harm. This, in turn, assumes: that human rights
protectors are always states, that states are always fully public, and that human rights
protectors themselves (being fully public, and being states) cannot be harmed in a way
that is relevant to human rights. These assumptions might be relevant to ideally
functioning liberal-democratic societies—I make no judgement on that in this article
one way or the other—but they can be very far removed from the facts on the ground
in contexts where human rights problems are apparent and urgent. These assumptions,
which stem from the lens of the harm principle, need to be tackled and analysed in
order to move forward, rather than left untouched as the supposed baseline that
underlies what the entire discussion of human rights protection is about.
As a response to this, the responsibility to protect human rights (lower-case letters)
can be viewed as deeply constitutive of public actors, whereas the RtoP framework is
mostly regulative.53 The RtoP works within a positivist international-legal framework,
where some actors have already been constituted as sovereign. The RtoP’s first pillar
takes this as given, picks out these sovereign actors as the responsible agents, and
spends most of its time and energy on questions of their retrospective responsibility to
prevent and to respond to imminent and actual atrocity. The only potentially
constitutive elements of the RtoP centre on sovereignty rather than on human rights.
One may ask within the RtoP: when does a state behave so badly that it does not
count as sovereign any more? The responsibility to protect human rights, by contrast,
does most of its work at the prospective end. It gives actors information about who
they would need to be, and what they would need to do, in order to count as human-
rights-responsible agents. The point of human rights practice is to change the reality
of social practices at a point far earlier than, and far deeper than, that at which
individuals are at concrete risk of harm. Rights can be unprotected, and agents can fail
to protect human rights, even if no harm is caused.
Conclusion
This article first drew an analytical distinction between the responsibility to protect
human rights (lower-case letters) and the Responsibility to Protect policy framework,
or RtoP. On the one hand, the article put aside the view that these are so radically
different that the process of trying to investigate their relationship is a non-starter. On
the other hand, the article put aside the view the RtoP is the only proper way to
understand the nature of an international responsibility to protect. Moving forward on
the basis that the nature of the relationship could be one of set and sub-set—with the
RtoP being one specific and non-exhaustive instantiation of a broader responsibility to
protect human rights—the article proceeded to investigate in substantive terms how
the kinds of responsibility assigned to agents under the responsibility to protect
human rights and the RtoP match up with one another.
In the final analysis, the differences between the two are significant. Firstly, the RtoP
is a reversion to a discourse of helpless victims and powerful saviours, whether those
saviours exist at the level of the responsible domestic state, or at the level of the
53 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 27-29.
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broader international community. By contrast, the responsibility to protect human
rights, in order to count as such, needs to treat people as rights-holders; the
responsibility assigned needs to co-relate to rights. The RtoP is overridingly
concerned with a discussion of retrospective responsibility, whereas the responsibility
to protect human rights needs to start with a focus that is prospective. This is different
from the distinction between prevention and response; there can be prospective and
retrospective responsibilities of prevention, as well as prospective and retrospective
responsibilities of response. The political purpose of the RtoP is associated with
defining a failure of responsibility, at the level of the supposedly least-contentious
first pillar, in terms of a clear link to building, imminent or actual harm. The
responsibility to protect human rights does not need to be understood in this way. The
point of the concept of the responsibility to protect human rights is to constitute
human-rights-responsible agents, who can fail to count as such—and therefore fail at
their responsibility—even if there is no clear link to harm.
It seems to me that there are two ways forward for those who want to work
constructively within the RtoP. The first way forward is to separate the RtoP very
clearly from the responsibility to protect human rights: simply stop referring to it as
linked to the broader framework of international human rights, or as a human-rights-
based norm. The RtoP is about atrocity prevention and response. This is a very
valuable and important endeavour, but it is not the same as protecting human rights. I
suspect that this way forward will not be adopted, as the RtoP draws heavily on its
claim to being based in human rights for moral authority and rhetorical support;
however this does not make the finding any less significant or any less important to
say. The second way forward would be for scholarship and practice to engage much
more systematically with the distinction that I have drawn between prospective and
retrospective responsibility. This involves the investigation of more ways that the
RtoP’s first pillar can be genuinely engaged in the assignment of prospective
responsibility to public institutions and agents. This is not as easy at it seems. It is not
enough to say quickly and uncritically that ‘sovereign states are responsible’, and then
to move on to discuss retrospective responsibility. It would mean thinking more
deeply about the constitution (rather than simply regulation) of agents as human rights
protectors, separately from their status as sovereign states.
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